ANÁLISE DA DECISÃO CAUTELAR SOBRE A UTILIZAÇÃO DE ÁREAS DE PRESERVAÇÃO PERMANENTE (ADI Nº 3.540/2005) À LUZ DA TEORIA ARGUMENTATIVA DE MACCORMICK by Lopes, Ana Maria D’Ávila & Teixeira, Diego Monte
135Veredas do Direito, Belo Horizonte,  v.13  n.27  p.135-155  Setembro/Dezembro de 2016
ANALYSIS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY 
DECISION ABOUT THE USE OF PERMANENT 
PRESERVATION AREAS (ADI N. 3.540/2005) IN 
LIGHT OF MACCORMICK’S ARGUMENTATIVE 
THEORY
Ana Maria D’Ávila Lopes
Doctor and Master of Constitutional Law from the Federal University of the 
State of Minas Gerais (UFMG).
Professor in the Law Post Graduation Program at the Fortaleza University (UNIFOR).
CNPq’s Research Productivity Scholarship. 
Email: anadavilalopes@yahoo.com.br
http://dx.doi.org/10.18623/rvd.v13i27.823
Diego Monte Teixeira
Attending Master of Constitutional Law at the Fortaleza University’s
Law Post Graduation  Program (UNIFOR).
Analyst at the Federal Public Prosecution/Legal Support/Law
Email: diegomontet@gmail.com
ABSTRACT
The present work aims to analyze, in the light of MacCormick’s 
argumentative theory, the precautionary decision issued at ADI n. 
3.540/2005, which stated the constitutionality of Provisional Measure n. 
2.166/2001 that regulated the use of Permanent Preservation Areas. On 
that purpose, a bibliographic, documentary and jurisprudential research 
was made. The conclusion was that the decision is not universalizable since 
it was exceptional as it admitted the regulation of a provision in art. 225 of 
the Federal Constitution by use of a Provisional Measure. It was also not 
consistent because the systemic arguments used in the vote of Minister-
Rapporteur, with which most Ministers agreed, were contradictory. It was 
also not coherent because the mention to some abstract constitutional 
standards to support it does not ensure that there was no violation to other 
standards. If the decision is not based on universalizable, consistent and 
coherent arguments, it cannot be considered an adequate or legitimate 
solution in a Democratic State of Law and it should not guide the analysis 
of seemingly similar cases as referred to in ADIs n. 4901, n. 4902 and n. 
4903 on the new Forest Code.
Keywords: Permanent Preservation Area; Juridical Argumentation; 
MacCormick.
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ANÁLISE DA DECISÃO CAUTELAR SOBRE A UTILIZAÇÃO DE 
ÁREAS DE PRESERVAÇÃO PERMANENTE (ADI Nº 3.540/2005) À LUZ 
DA TEORIA ARGUMENTATIVA DE MACCORMICK
RESUMO
O presente trabalho objetiva analisar, à luz da teoria argumentativa de 
MacCormick, a decisão cautelar prolatada na ADI nº 3.540/2005, na qual 
se decidiu pela constitucionalidade da Medida Provisória no 2.166/2001, 
que regulamentou o uso das Áreas de Preservação Permanente. Para tal, 
realizou-se pesquisa na doutrina, legislação e jurisprudência nacionais, 
concluindo-se que a decisão não foi universalizável, já que se deu de forma 
excepcional em termos de admitir a regulamentação de um dispositivo do 
art. 225 da Constituição Federal por meio de Medida Provisória. Não foi 
também consistente, eis que os argumentos sistêmicos utilizados no voto 
do Ministro-Relator, com os quais concordou a maioria dos Ministros, 
mostraram-se contraditórios, e também não foi coerente, porque a 
invocação de alguns dispositivos constitucionais de caráter abstrato para 
fundamentá-la, por si só, não assegura que houve a inviolabilidade de outras 
normas do ordenamento. Se a decisão não está baseada em argumentos 
universalizáveis, consistentes e coerentes não pode ser considerada uma 
solução adequada, nem legítima, no Estado Democrático de Direito, e 
tampouco deve servir para orientar a análise de casos aparentemente 
similares como os veiculados nas ADIs nº 4901, nº 4902 e nº 4903 relativos 
ao novo Código Florestal.
Palavras-Chave: Áreas de Preservação Permanente; Argumentação 
Jurídica; MacCormick.
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INTRODUCTION
With the imminent judgment of three Direct Unconstitutionality 
Actions (ADIs n. 4.901/2013, n. 4.902/2013 and n. 4.903/2013) under 
preliminary injunction requests in which the Attorney General questions 
several provisions of the new Forest Code (Law n. 12.651/2012), it is 
necessary that the doctrine analyzes the argument used by the Federal 
Supreme Court within the scope of the precautionary measure issued in ADI 
n. 3.540/2005, in which it decided to maintain the validity of Provisional 
Measure n. 2.166-67, in the part that changed the wording of art. 4, caption 
and §§1 to 7 of Law 4.771/1965 (former Forest Code), to allow for the use 
of Permanent Preservation Areas in exceptional cases.
The issue raised in ADIs n. 4901, n. 4902 and n. 4903, the 
relationship between State economic development (article 3, II, c/c 
article 170, VI of the 1988 Federal Constitution) and the safeguard of 
the ecologically protected environment (article 225 of the 1988 Federal 
Constitution), is the same one that was raised in ADI’s precautionary 
measure n. 3.540/2005, which could lead the interpreter to a hasty reference 
to its grounds when analyzing the cases that now reach the appreciation of 
the Praetorium Excelsior, as if they were similar situations.
In view of this scenario, this article aims to analyze the arguments 
of the precautionary decision issued in ADI n. 3.540 / 2005, in which 
the Federal Supreme Court, by a majority, denied a referendum on the 
decision of the Minister President that had suspended the effectiveness 
and applicability of the provision questioned in Provisional Measure n. 
2.166/2001. Such provisions remained in force until 2012, when they were 
repealed together with Law n. 4.771/1965 (former Forest Code) by Law n. 
12.651/2012 (new Forest Code), which also led to the supervening loss of 
the object of ADI n. 3.540/2005.
The comparison of the decision is based on Neil MacCormick’s 
theory that proposes parameters to identify the correctness of decisions in 
practical and complex situations. On that purpose, the work is structured 
as follows: first of all, a brief sketch is presented on Neil MacCormick’s 
theory of interpretive arguments; then a survey on the linguistic, systemic 
and teleological arguments of STF’s decision is carried out; finally, an 
assessment on whether the requirements of universality, consistency and 
coherence have been met in order to evaluate the correctness of STF’s 
decision regarding the reasoning that justifies it.
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1 A BRIEF OUTLINE OF NEIL MACCORMICK’S THEORY ON 
INTERPRETATIVE ARGUMENTS  
Article 93, item IX of the 1988 Federal Constitution establishes 
that all the decisions issued by the Judiciary Power’s bodies must be 
justified, under penalty of nullity. That is a provision deriving from the 
very concept of Democratic State of Law, in which only decisions based 
on a rational conviction of the courts can be considered legitimate. In 
this sense, for Moreira (1998, p.90), extra-procedural control must be 
exercised, first and foremost, by citizens under jurisdiction themselves in 
genere, such control being an essential condition for strengthening the trust 
in jurisdictional protection as a factor of social cohesion and the soundness 
of the institutions.
In this context, the argumentative theories that aim at proposing 
parameters to assess whether a decision was justified or not are highlighted. 
Among these, focus is given on the one developed by Neil MacCormick.
MacCormick sees the legal argumentation as a branch of practical 
argumentation, both when a decision is taken from the deductive reasoning 
of the standard (syllogistic) and when other non-deductive elements are 
used, as it happens in certain difficult cases (MACCORMICK, 2006, p. 
IX). In these latter cases, the justification of the choice between possible 
rival deliberations within the same operating legal system becomes critical 
(MACCORMICK, 2006, p 127-129).
According to MacCormick (2010, pp. 70-75), when giving 
a preference to one of the possible readings of some legal provision, 
the interpreter and applicator of the Law uses the following types of 
interpretative arguments: linguistic, systemic and teleological-evaluative. 
In summary, linguistic arguments are divided between those who deal 
with the ordinary meaning of the term used in the legal text (common 
language) and those dealing with the specialized vocabulary of the 
normative proposition (technical language). The systemic arguments are 
those oriented to the understanding of the normative provisions as part of 
the legal system, divided into: a) the contextual harmonization; B) the legal 
precedent argument; C) the analogy; D) the logical-conceptual (general 
concept already recognized in the doctrine); E) the general principles of 
Law; F) the historical argument. The teleological arguments are those 
referring to the purpose of certain normative provisions from the assumption 
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that they were produced by a rational legislator. (MACCORMICK, 2010, 
pp. 70-74).
Due to the possibility of conflicts between those kinds of 
arguments, MacCormick (2010, p. 75) says that one must start from the 
linguistic arguments, then moving on to the systemic ones, and only use 
the teleological ones when the other types of arguments are insufficient. 
Thus, there would be a kind of “golden rule” created by part of the Scottish 
and English doctrine, which would act as a maxim of practical wisdom 
in order to give priority to linguistic arguments, leaving the teleological 
arguments as the last case.
However, MacCormick warns (2010, p. 76) that it would be 
incorrect to leave the teleological arguments to the end in some cases, 
especially when such a practice could create injustice in relation to a 
legally recognized principle of justice or when it frustrates public policy 
objectives pursued by legislation.
In view of these considerations, it would be up to the judge to 
know how to handle the different types of arguments to keep a balance 
between them (LOPES; BENÍCIO, 2015, p. 44).
2 ANALYSIS OF INTERPRETATIVE ARGUMENTS USED IN ADI 
N. 3.540/2005 
The Permanent Protection Areas - APPs were created by the 
currently revoked Forest Code, Law n. 4.771 dated September 15, 1965, 
art. 1, paragraph 2, item II, “with the environmental function of preserving 
water resources, landscape, geological stability, biodiversity, the fauna and 
flora gene flow, protecting the soil and ensuring the wellness of human 
populations” (BRAZIL, 1965). 
In 2001, Provisional Measure n. 2.166-67 was published 
(BRAZIL, 2001). It amended the wording of art. 4 of the above mentioned 
Code so as to allow the suppression of vegetation in the APPs in cases of 
public utility or social interest. At the same time, the Provisional Measure 
included items IV and V in paragraph 2 of article 1, which defined what 
should be understood by public utility and social interest. Other unusual 
cases of human intervention were envisaged in the seven paragraphs of 
article 4, including situations in which just the authorization of the federal1, 
1 In 2006, the National Council of Environment - CONAMA issued Resolution n. 369 in which the 
exceptional cases of public utility, social interest or low environmental impact, which allow for inter-
ventions or suppression of vegetation in APPs, were regulated.
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state and municipal environmental protection agency would be necessary, 
contrary to art. 225, §1, item III of the 1988 Federal Constitution - CF/88 
(BRAZIL, 1988), which establishes that the Public Power shall “define, 
in all units of the Federation, territorial spaces and their components to be 
specially protected, changes and suppression being allowed only by the 
law and any use that compromises the integrity of the attributes that justify 
its protection is forbidden” (bolded by the author).
In the face of this situation, the Attorney General of the Republic 
filed a Direct Unconstitutionality Action (ADI n. 3.540/2005) before the 
Federal Supreme Court - STF, whose rapporteur was Minister Celso de 
Mello (STF, 2005). At that time, the request for a preliminary injunction 
was made and was initially granted by Minister Nelson Jobim, President 
of the Court, once the request was made during court holidays. After the 
holidays, the Ministers decided the precautionary measure.
The following is an analysis of the arguments used by the 
Attorney General of the Republic, the author of ADI 3.540/2005, to defend 
the unconstitutionality of Provisional Measure n. 2.166-67 in the part 
where it conferred the wording of art. 4, caption, and paragraphs 1 to 7 of 
Law n. 4.771/65, as well as the arguments invoked by the STF Ministers 
in the precautionary decision issued on September 1, 2005. The analysis is 
carried out in the light of Neil MacCormick’s theory, making a difference 
between the linguistic interpretative, systemic and teleological arguments 
used. 
A) Arguments of the Federal Attorney General
- Linguistic argument: Provisional Measure n. 2.166-67/2001, in 
the part where it conferred the wording of art. 4, caption, and §§1 to 7 of 
Law 4.771/1965, violated art. 225, §1, III of CF/88 that requires acts of 
modification and/or suppression of specially protected territorial spaces to 
be submitted to the postulate of the absolute rule of law in a formal sense.
- Systemic argument: the competence to authorize the change 
and suppression of a Permanent Preservation Area (APP), a species of 
the gender especially protected territorial area, belongs exclusively to 
the Legislative Branch and that competence cannot be delegated to the 
administrative authority.
- Teleological argument: article 225 of CF/88 defines the protection 
of the ecologically balanced environment and Provisional Measure n. 
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2.166-67/2001, in the part that conferred the wording of art. 4, caput, and 
§§1 to 7 of Law n. 4.771/1965, has the opposite purpose since it allows the 
use of APPs in certain cases.
B) Minister Celso de Mello (Rapporteur)’s Arguments
- Linguistic argument: only the change and suppression of the legal 
regime relevant to especially protected territorial areas qualify, because 
of the clause contained in art. 225, paragraph 1, III of CF/88, as subject 
to the principle of reservation of formal law, not covering the cases of 
suppression of existing vegetation.
- Systemic arguments: i) The fundamental right to the ecologically 
balanced environment is in the category of third generation rights, according 
to Celso Lafer and Paulo Affonso Leme Machado’s doctrine, as well as a 
precedent of the STF itself (RTJ 158/205-206); ii) There is a link between 
the ecologically balanced environment and the enjoyment of adequate living 
conditions for the human race, so that the environment is a public heritage 
that must necessarily be ensured and protected by social organizations 
and state institutions, as set out in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on 
the environment, at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (Rio 92), in addition to the doctrinal approach of Geraldo 
Eulálio do Nascimento e Silva and José Afonso da Silva; iii) The doctrine 
understands that the ecologically balanced environment, as public heritage, 
qualifies as an inalienable charge of the Public Power and of the collectivity 
that is always imposed for the benefit of present and future generations. 
Examples of scholars mentioned: Maria Sylvia Zanella de Pietro and Luis 
Roberto Barroso; iiii) The doctrine argues that national legal orders and 
formulations at the international level are no longer disconnected from the 
reality that qualifies the right to the ecologically balanced environment as 
of collective ownership. Example of scholars mentioned: José Francisco 
Rezek and José Afonso da Silva; iiiii) Provisional Measure n. 2.166-
67/2001 was issued in absolute fidelity to such constitutional values  and 
the practice of the last four years (as presented by amici curiae) did not 
result in a predatory effect on the environmental heritage.
- Teleological arguments: i) The overcoming of the antagonism 
between the national development imperative (article 3, II, CF/88) and 
the need to preserve the integrity of the environment (article 225, CF/88) 
depends on the concrete situation, interests and rights under conflict in 
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order to harmonize them and prevent them from annihilating each other. 
The interpretative vector is the principle of sustainable development, 
as formulated in the Rio de Janeiro Declaration on Environment and 
Development - Rio 92 and recognized in doctrine. Scholars mentioned: 
Celso Antônio Pacheco Fiorillo, Luís Paulo Sirvinskas, Marcelo Abelha 
Rodrigues, Nicolao Dino de Castro e Costa Neto, Daniel Sarmento, Luís 
Roberto Barroso, José Carlos Vieira de Andrade, J. J. Gomes Canotilho, 
Edilsom Pereira de Farias, Wilson Antônio Steinmez and Suzana de 
Toledo Barros; ii) The provisions questioned, far from compromising 
the values  enshrined in art. 225 of CF/88, would be establishing State 
control mechanisms regarding activities carried out within the scope of the 
permanent preservation areas
C) Minister Nelson Jobim’s Arguments (President of STF)
- Linguistic argument: the changes and the suppression referred 
to in item III of § 1 of art. 225 of CF/88 relate to the very constitution of 
the geographical space encompassed by the preservation area and not the 
suppression of existing vegetation.
- Systemic argument: the STF, in the case of Chapada dos Veadeiros, 
would have established that not only the suppression of the preservation 
area, but also the change to its topographic design should be the subject to 
a law, not being left to the Executive Branch. However, in this case, the 
object of the challenged provisions would only be the form by which the 
exploration of an established area of  environmental preservation would be 
feasible.
D) Minister Eros Grau’s Arguments
- Linguistic argument: the manifestation of the legislative branch 
referred to in item III, paragraph 1, art. 225 of CF/88 concerns changes and 
suppression of especially protected territorial spaces and not the existing 
vegetation.
E) Minister Carlos Britto’s Arguments
- Linguistic arguments: i) The term “suppress” is equivalent to 
extinguish, extirpate, pull out, eradicate, eliminate. On the other hand, the 
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term “vegetation” would be the collective of vegetal, or a whole set of 
botanical specimens; ii) The final part of item III, paragraph 1, art. 225 of 
the CF/88 establishes a constitutional limitation for the Legislative itself, 
that is, even via the law, any use that would compromise the integrity of 
protected space attributes would be prohibited. 
- Systemic argument: When it comes to the case of expropriation 
of an individual good, the formal law defines and lists the hypotheses of 
social interest, social utility and public need. In the case under review, 
the Provisional Measure delegated everything to the discretion of the 
administrative entities;
- Teleological argument: a spirit of leniency, laxity pervades 
Provisional Measure n. 2.166-67/2001 in such a way that even the 
vegetation that protects the springs can be suppressed.
F) Minister Cezar Peluso’s Arguments
- Linguistic argument: the first sentence in art. 225, §1º, III of CF/88 
deals with the change and suppression of especially protected spaces, while 
the second one deals with the use of the space. Thus, the Constitution only 
imposes the requirement of a law to change and suppress space and that is 
not the case of the Provisional Measure, which is only regulating the use.
- Teleological argument: the literal interpretation mentioned above 
also corresponds to the rationality of the rule in art. 225, §1º, III of CF/88, 
firstly because otherwise, a series of projects, activities and works of public 
interest and an urgent nature would be rendered unfeasible by the absence 
of legal regulations; secondly, because it would be easier to control the 
practice of an administrative act than issuing a formal law.
G) Minister Ellen Grace’s Arguments
- Systemic argument: the reasons for the Minister Rapporteur’s 
vote were added to the ones presented by the amici curiae when listing 
a large number of major construction initiatives that would be rendered 
unfeasible by the confirmation of the preliminary measure granted in the 
decision under the referendum of the Plenary.
H) Minister Marco Aurélio’s Arguments
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- Linguistic argument: the word “change” has its own vernacular 
meaning and the 1988 constituent did not make any exceptions as to the 
purpose of this change. Thus, where CF/88 requires the existence of a 
law, one cannot accept that the change takes place through a Provisional 
Measure.
- Systemic arguments: i) It was not the responsibility of the Head 
of the Executive branch to discipline matters that could entail irrecoverable 
damage, in addition to the urgency and relevancy requirements for the 
issuance of a provisional measure not being present, considering that the 
Forest Code had been in force for many years; ii) There was a formal defect 
in the standardization of the subject, which should have gone through the 
evaluation of the Brazilian people’s representatives - the federal deputies 
and the representatives of the states - the senators; iii) All the provisions in 
art. 225 refer their regulation to the law in a formal and material sense, and 
the STF would never have considered that it was possible to regulate the 
CF/88 by means of a provisional measure; iiii) the provision in item III, §1, 
art. 225 of CF/88 is necessarily aimed at the issuance of a law that, given 
the circumstances involved in the respective project, makes an exception to 
the preservation, to the intangibility of the protected territorial space.
- Teleological argument: considering the values  related to the 
economic development and the preservation targeted by CF/88, there is a 
greater risk in maintaining Provisional Measure n. 2.166-67 / 2001.
I) Minister Sepúlveda Pertence’s Arguments
- Systemic argument: referring to the Minister Rapporteur’s vote 
where he states that the Provisional Measure replaced the original wording 
of the Forest Code, which would be more open than the wording of 
Provisional Measure n. 2.166-67/2001 itself.
J) Arguments on the Abstract of the Decision
- Linguistic argument: only the change and suppression of the 
legal regime pertaining to especially protected territorial areas qualify as 
matters subject to the principle of the legal reserve, as a result of the clause 
contained in art. 225, § 1, III, CF/88.
- Systemic arguments: i) Everyone has the right to an ecologically 
balanced environment. It is a typical third-generation (or brand-new) right, 
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which assists the whole human race; ii) The State and the collectivity itself 
have the special obligation to defend and preserve, for the benefit of present 
and future generations, this collective trans-individual ownership right; iii) 
The fulfillment of this incontrovertible burden represents the guarantee 
that serious intergenerational conflicts marked by disrespect for the duty of 
solidarity imposed on all in the protection of this essential good of common 
use of people in general shall not be installed within the collectivity; iiii) 
environment safety cannot be compromised by business interests in the 
economic activity, considered as the constitutional discipline that rules 
it, subordinated, among other general principles, to the one that favors 
“environment defense” (CF/88, article 170, VI); iiiii) The instruments of a 
legal and constitutional nature aim to make effective environment protection 
possible so that the inherent properties and attributes are not changed, which 
would cause unacceptable impairment of health, safety, culture, work and 
of the population’s wellness, besides causing serious ecological damages 
to the environmental heritage considered in its physical or natural aspect; 
iiiii) the principle of sustainable development, besides being impregnated 
with an eminently constitutional character, finds legitimizing support in 
international commitments assumed by the Brazilian State and represents 
a factor in obtaining the fair balance between the demands of the economy 
and those of the ecology, subordinated, however, to the invocation of this 
postulate when there is a situation of conflict between relevant constitutional 
values, to an unavoidable condition, the observance of which does not 
compromise or empty the essential content of one of the most significant 
fundamental rights: the right to environment preservation, which translates 
goods commonly used by people in general, to be safeguarded in favor of 
present and future generations;
- Teleological arguments: i) Provisional Measure n. 2.166-67/2001, 
where it introduced significant changes to art. 4 of the former Forest Code, 
far from compromising the constitutional values  enshrined in art. 225, 
CF/88, established mechanisms that allow for real control by the State 
over the activities developed in the context of the PPAs in order to prevent 
predatory and harmful actions against the environmental heritage, whose 
situation of greater vulnerability demands more intense protection that is 
now appropriately provided in the constitutional text by the normative 
document referred to; ii)  the Public Power can lawfully, whatever the 
institutional dimension it may have in the federative structure, authorize, 
permit or allow for the execution of construction works and/or the 
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performance of services within the especially protected territorial spaces, 
provided that the restrictions, limitations and requirements abstractly set 
forth by the law are respected and since that does not compromise the 
integrity of the attributes that justified the creation of a special protection 
legal regime regarding those territories (CF/88, art. 225, § 1, III). 
3 THE APPLICATION OF THE UNIVERSABILITY, CONSISTENCY 
AND COHERENCE REQUIREMENTS PROPOSED BY 
MACCORMICK
If, on the one hand, one agrees with Streck (2014, p. 19) in the 
sense that the great challenge of the current Brazilian doctrine is to establish 
conditions to strengthen a democratic space for the construction of legality 
according to the constitutional text, it is clear that even the main defenders 
of the possibility of a deductive debate over the text of the law, such as 
Alexy and MacCormick, acknowledge the inadequacy of this deduction in 
the so-called difficult cases. Likewise, even positivists such as H.L.A Hart 
recognize the existence of certain cases in which the Law fails to directly 
provide the elements for a decision (TOMAZETTE, 2011, p. 163).
As pointed out in topic 2, ADI case n. 3.540/2005 is just another 
typical hard case in which it is not possible to deduce the decision to be 
made from the letter of the Law. Before such cases, Neil MacCormick 
proposes a second order justification so that the decision must comply 
with the requirements of universality, consistency and coherence 
(MACCORMICK, 2008, p. 247).
The requirement of universality arises from the application of 
the principle of equality so as to prevent different decisions for similar 
situations. This is because “the notion of formal justice requires decision 
justification in individual cases to always be based on universal propositions 
that the judge is willing to adopt as a basis for defining other similar cases 
and deciding them similarly to the current one” (MACCORMICK, 2006, 
p. 126).
By means of the consistency requirement, the decision must be 
based on arguments that do not contradict each other (LOPES; BENÍCIO, 
2015, p. 50). For Atienza (2006, p. 128), the consistency requirement must 
be extended to the factual assumption, so that the decision is according to 
the reality presented in terms of evidence. However, the analysis of this 
aspect is not going to be necessary for the comparison of the arguments 
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of the precautionary measure in ADI n. 3.540/2005 once it is an abstract 
constitutionality control in which the matter under discussion is eminently 
law.
The coherence requirement, in turn, demands the several standards 
in a system to make sense when considered as a whole (MACCORMICK, 
2006, p. 197), that is, the criterion of coherence concerns the justification 
of the decision in the general context of the juridical system.
Concluding with Martins, Roesler and Jesus (2011, p. 214-215), 
there are two important distinctions between consistency and coherence 
for Neil MacCormick: the first one concerns consistency linked to the idea 
of  no logical contradiction between two or more rules, while coherence 
would be present when the group of propositions, taken as a whole, makes 
sense as a whole; the second one refers to the connection between the idea 
of  coherence and the valorative characteristic of the legal order, so that 
coherence would be the “axiological compatibility between two or more 
rules, all of them justifiable from the perspective of a common principle.”
Within this framework and from the tables in topic 2, it is 
possible to check whether the requirements of universability, consistency 
and coherence in the precautionary decision issued in ADI n. 3540/2005 
have been met.
3.1 Universability
From an overview of the decision, that is, without unitarily 
considering the votes of the Ministers, it is possible to notice that the 
precautionary decision issued in ADI n. 3.540/2005 does not comply with 
the universability requirement since it was the first and only time the Federal 
Supreme Court has exceptionally allowed the possibility of regulating one 
of the provisions of art. 225, CF/88 by means of a provisional measure.
This aspect was clarified in the Plenary with Minister Marco 
Aurélio’s argument: “Items and paragraphs of article 225 refer to the 
law [...] The Federal Supreme Court has never stated that it is possible to 
regulate, by law, the Federal Constitution through a provisional measure” 
(STF, 2005, p.589).
However, the votes of each one of the Ministers, except the 
votes of Ministers Carlos Britto and Marco Aurélio, admit the possibility 
of reducing the protection spectrum of especially protected spaces by 
means of a provisional measure, although they were created with the clear 
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intension of ensuring the effectiveness of environmental hygiene.
3.2 Consistency
The Minister-Rapporteur, Celso de Mello, was responsible for 
the vote leading the decision followed by the majority in the Plenary, and 
he did it, as usual, through a complex hermeneutical construction supported 
by a comprehensive doctrine on environmental issues.
However, the arguments used by Minister Celso de Mello in the 
constitutional interpretation of art. 225, §1, III of CF/88 were contradictory 
among themselves, but they still influenced the decision of most of his 
peers.
At the outset, the Minister devoted seven pages of his vote in 
defense of a systematic interpretation of art. 225 of CF/88, raising the right 
to the ecologically balanced environment to the level of a 3rd generation 
fundamental right, whose ownership transcends the plan of the present 
generations and goes beyond the national scope of protection to be faithful 
to the commitment of Nations in favor of all Humanity (STF, 2015, p. 542-
548).
We notice here the rich argumentative load of Minister Celso de 
Mello, who clearly sees the double force of the right to the ecologically 
balanced environment, conceived both as a human right that should be 
ensured at the international level, and a fundamental right duly declared 
and protected in the Brazilian constitutional sphere.
The Minister-Rapporteur reinforced this understanding by citing 
the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Environment and the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (Rio 92) in his vote, together 
with various doctrinal positions that recognize the right to the ecologically 
balanced environment as a human right stated in international documents 
having supralegal hierarchy2. Although they cannot be used as parameters 
for the control of constitutionality, they are an interpretive source for the 
understanding and application of national standards due to their relevance 
for the protection of human dignity.
Likewise, in affirming that the environment is a public heritage 
to be “necessarily assured and protected by social bodies and state 
institutions” (STF, 2005, p. 547), Minister Celso de Mello indicated the 
unavailability of that right, reflecting a duty that is not only moral, but also 
2 Pursuant to the positioning of STF in Extraordinary Appeal n. 466.343-1/SP (STF, 2008).
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legal in the transmission of such heritage to future generations. (MILARÉ, 
2015, p.175).
Then, breaking the line of argument he had developed in favor 
of this fundamental right, the Minister Rapporteur stated that Provisional 
Measure no. 2,166-67 / 2001 maintained absolute fidelity to constitutional 
values  and that the practice of the four years of validity of this norm Had 
not shown any damaging and predatory effect on environmental heritage, 
as argued by the representatives of the Executive Branch who defended the 
constitutionality of the aforementioned Provisional Measure (STF, 2005, 
pp. 549-556).
Then, breaking the line of argument he had been developing 
in support of the fundamental right referred to, the Minister Rapporteur 
stated that Provisional Measure n. 2166-67/2001 was absolutely loyal to 
constitutional values  and that the practice during the four years when the 
standard was in force had not shown any damaging and predatory effect on 
environmental heritage, as argued by the representatives of the Executive 
Branch who defended the constitutionality of the Provisional Measure 
mentioned above (STF, 2005, p. 549-556).
Thus, if Provisional Measure n. 2.166-67/2001, in the part where 
it conferred the wording of art. 4, caput and paragraphs 1 to 7 of Law n. 
4.771/1965, changed the use of the PPAs in order to relativize the permanent 
preservation regime in certain cases, how to say that such standard would 
be in compliance with the constitutional values  that recommend the 
fundamental right to the ecologically balanced environment?
Permission to intervene in areas declared by law as permanent 
preservation will inevitably lead to damages to the environment. What can 
be discussed - from one side or the other - is whether interventions in these 
areas would be such as to affect environmental balance and touch the core 
of the fundamental right protected, but arguments of that kind were not 
analyzed by the Ministers.
In fact, there was a brief clash in the Plenary following the vote 
of Minister Carlos Britto when he tried to carry out an interpretation of the 
provisions in Provisional Measure n. 2.166-67/2001 according to CF/88 
to avoid that administrative bodies had wide discretion to authorize even 
the suppression of vegetation in APPs. The clash, though, did not last, as 
Minister Celso de Mello stated that the constitutional clause itself (article 
225, paragraph 1, III) forbids any use of the protected space that could 
compromise the integrity of the attributes that justify its protection (STF, 
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2005, p. 576-579).
Minister Marco Aurélio stated that the term “change” of the 
protected area could, in the case under consideration, imply the total 
suppression of vegetation in an APP, representing a substantial change, 
which could not occur by means of a provisional measure (STF, 2005, p. 
591).
In summary, after making a long defense of the right to an 
ecologically balanced environment, Minister-Rapporteur Celso de Mello, 
without analyzing the benefits of the APPs for the effectiveness of the 
fundamental3 right referred to and the potential risks that would be caused 
from the forecast in a Provisional Measure of intervention in these areas, 
concluded that this regulatory standard would represent a step forward in 
strengthening measures aimed at preserving the attributes that characterize 
PPAs.
In fact, what one can notice after reading the Ministers’ votes 
is that contested Provisional Measure n. 2.166-67/2001 was issued to 
privilege national development (article 3, II of CF/88). The Minister-
Rapporteur even pointed out the existence of a permanent state of tension 
between this constitutional value and the one of environmental balance. 
Both values, according to him, should be pondered to be harmonized, 
having the principle of sustainable development as an interpretive vector 
(STF, 2005, p. 565). However, the reasons why the prevalence of national 
development took precedence were not pointed out.
The contradiction of the Minister Rapporteur’s arguments 
that Provisional Measure n. 2116-67/2001 would be in harmony with 
constitutional environmental values  is evident in the teleological argument 
invoked by Minister Cezar Peluso when he states that the interpretation of 
the provision in art. 225, paragraph 1, III of CF/88 given by the Rapporteur 
corresponds to the rationality of the standard once the absence of the 
Provisional Measure “would invalidate [...] a series of projects, activities 
and construction works having public interest and urgent characteristics 
because they depend on regulation, authorization or permitting through 
Legislative Power’s acts, which demands time [...]” (STF, 2005, page 
583).
Considering that Ministers Nelson Jobim, Eros Grau, Ellen Grace, 
Sepúlveda Pertence and Cezar Peluso followed the interpretation of the 
3 APPs’ environmental functions are foreseen in art. 3, II of the Forest Code in force: preserve water 
resources, the landscape, the geological stability and biodiversity, ease the flora and the fauna’s gene 
flow, protect the soil and insure the wellness of human populations (BRAZIL, 2012).
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constitutional mechanism adopted by the Minister Rapporteur, one could 
register an inconsistency by dragging. Most of the abstract corresponding 
to precautionary measure for ADI n. 3.540/2005 is intended to emphasize 
that Provisional Measure n. 2.166-67/2001 was issued to make the 
fundamental right to an ecologically balanced environment effective, but it 
simultaneously refers to the country’s economic development.
Regarding the linguistic argument, there are no inconsistencies 
in the interpretation of art. 225, paragraph 1 of CF/88 by the Minister 
Rapporteur, who understood that the rule of law was only required to 
change and suppress the legal regime corresponding to especially protected 
territorial spaces. 
3.3 Coherence
The notion of coherence calls for a rationality that must be 
reflected in the decision both internally, regarding the arguments used in 
the decision, and externally, as there must be a rational connection between 
the arguments used, the facts narrated and the legal order as a whole 
(MARTINS, ROESLER and JESUS, 2011, p. 215).
From the analysis of the arguments listed in the decision abstract 
(table 10), one can notice that the decision is coherent from an external 
perspective since the fundamental principle of national development, 
foreseen in art. 3, II of CF/88, as well as the principle of sustainable 
development, a value already absorbed by several international treaties, 
were invoked “as a factor to achieve the right balance between the 
demands of both the economy and the ecology” (STF, 2005). In invoking 
these principles, the Praetorium Excelsior demonstrates an advantage to 
guarantee a relative coherence to the judgment so as to harmonize the group 
of constitutional propositions related to economic development (article 3, 
II of CF/88) and the need to preserve environment integrity (arts. 170, VI 
and 225 of CF/88).
In what regards the internal arguments of the decision itself, 
one cannot say that the requirement of coherence has been met. This is 
because, although Provisional Measure n. 2.166-67/2001 does not confront 
the letter of the standard contained in art. 225, paragraph 1, III of CF/88, 
in which a formal law is only required in case of change or suppression of 
APPs, the possibility of suppressing vegetation in these areas by means 
of administrative authorizations may seriously and definitively jeopardize 
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their ecological balance. Not considering this aspect in the arguments 
empties the pure and simple invocation of the principle of sustainable 
development and reveals the incoherence of the decision.
CONCLUSION
Injunction decision in ADI n. 3.540/2005 issued by the Federal 
Supreme Court (STF) on the validity of Provisional Measure n. 2.166-
67/2001, which regulated the hypothesis of using Permanent Preservation 
Areas (article 4, caption, and §§ 1 to 7 of Law n. 4.771/1965), is a typical 
hard case. A case is considered hard when it is not possible to conclude the 
decision to be made directly from the letter of the law. In these situations, 
it is necessary to use special criteria to assess the accuracy of the decision, 
given to that judicial decisions must be rationally justified in a Democratic 
State of Law.
The need for judicial decisions to be appropriately substantiated 
and the criteria to assess compliance with this requirement has been addressed 
by the argumentative theories. Among these theories, we highlight the one 
defended by Neil MacCormick, who proposes universality, consistency 
and coherence as criteria to determine the accuracy of a decision.
Following this proposal, the types of interpretive arguments used 
by the author and by each one of the STF Ministers in the precautionary 
decision in ADI n. 3.540/2005 (linguistic, systematic and teleological 
arguments) were initially identified. After that, the accuracy of the decision 
was analyzed based on the three criteria proposed by Neil MacCormick.
From the analysis undertaken herein, the conclusion was that the 
precautionary decision regarding ADI n. 3.540/2005 is not universalizable 
because the possibility of regulating a provision in art. 225 of the 1988 
Federal Constitution by means of a Provisional Measure was considered 
an exceptional situation and should not therefore be repeated. It is also not 
consistent because the systemic arguments used in the vote of the Minister-
Rapporteur, with which most of the Ministers agreed, were contradictory. 
Finally, although apparently coherent from an external perspective, from 
the harmonization of the group of constitutional propositions regarding 
economic development (article 3, II, CF/88) and the need to preserve the 
integrity of the environment (article 170, VI and 225 of CF/88), the absence 
of evaluation of the potential compromise of the ecological balance due 
to the suppression of vegetation in APPs, based on predictions of the 
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challenged standard, empties the argumentation itself of the principle of 
sustainable development and reveals the internal inconsistency within the 
decision.
However, there is a need to recognize some positive aspects of 
the decision, since it built a systematic interpretation of art. 225 of the 1988 
Federal Constitution, in order to raise the right to an ecologically balanced 
environment to the level of a third generation fundamental right and also 
to draw an interconnection between this fundamental right and human 
rights aspirations at the international level. Thus, the arguments used in 
the decision would suggest a revisitation when the Praetorium Excelsior 
examines similar cases in which there would be a tension between the 
ideals of economic development and the environment. If the decision in 
ADI n. 3.540/2005 is not based on universalizable, consistent and coherent 
arguments, it cannot be seen as an adequate or legitimate solution in the 
Democratic State of Law and it should not be used to guide the analysis 
of apparently similar cases such as the ones published in ADIs 4901, 4902 
and 4903 on the new Forest Code.
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